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A
mAbstract
US farm programs have been moving towards using insurance to provide the farm
safety net for many years but this policy transformation has not been realized for
dairy farms. Historically, support for dairy farmers focused on milk price but has been
declining in real terms for decades. Dairy policy in the US has been in flux because
of the recent increases in feed price levels and increases in export markets that have
made historic milk price supports essentially irrelevant. Recently a program of
subsidized insurance for the margin between milk and feed price has met with
limited success. We analyze the potential demand for margin insurance using
estimates from a survey of US dairy farmers. Dairy farmers with larger herds and
more education were willing to pay more for the insurance. In addition, those dairy
farm operators who had used milk and feed price risk instruments in the past were
willing to pay more for margin insurance than those who had not. However, the
willingness-to-pay for these contracts by farmers who had not used risk management
tools was low, calling into question the feasibility of using margin insurance as the
foundation of policies intended to support all dairy farms.
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U.S. agricultural policy has been experiencing a long-term shift towards insurance and
away from traditional commodity programs with price supports and deficiency payments.
Total government spending on farm safety net programs which include both commodity
programs and crop insurance fell by two-thirds from fiscal years 2000 to 2012 (Crop
Insurance in America, 2013). This reduction took place as spending on commodity programs
was replaced by crop insurance. Acknowledging this shift the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture
stated that “…at the end of the day crop insurance is going to be the lynchpin of the safety net”
(Vilsack, 2013). This sentiment was echoed by the Administrator of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture Risk Management Agency who noted that in the 2014 farm bill insurance would
be “…the only title that will see a significant increase in spending” (Willis, 2014).
Congress first authorized crop insurance in the 1930’s in the period after the Great
Depression that was the beginning of many agricultural policies that still exist today
(Glauber, 2013). Crop insurance was mostly limited to major crops (e.g., corn) in the
primary producing areas until the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 (U.S. Department
of Agriculture, Risk Management Agency USDA-RMA 2013c). The 1980 Act expanded
crops and areas eligible for insurance and authorized a 30 percent subsidy of the2015 Wolf and Widmar; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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ments remained common. In 2000 legislation was enacted which expanded the role of the
private sector in developing new contracts, premium subsidies were increased, and re-
strictions on the development of livestock (and dairy) insurance products were removed.
The result is that acres covered by crop insurance increased from 45 million in 1981 to
272 million in 2008 (Goodwin and Smith, 2013). The majority of U.S. corn, soybeans and
wheat acres have been insured in recent years. Thus, the largest crops by acres cultivated
and sales have been largely covered by crop insurance policies. The same cannot be said,
however, for specialty crops, livestock, and dairy production.
With respect to livestock and dairy enterprises, the development and adoption of in-
surance following the easing of restrictions in 2000 has been slow. An effort was made
following the 2008 Farm Bill to increase availability of insurance instruments for live-
stock and dairy to provide a foundation for the safety net policies. Livestock Gross
Margin Insurance for Dairy (LGM-Dairy) was introduced to a limited set of states in
2008 and expanded broadly in 2010 (Gould and Cabrera, 2011). Dairy farmer participa-
tion has been limited and calls into question the ability of this type of voluntary insur-
ance tool to be the foundation of US dairy safety net programs. Key considerations
include whether dairy farmers would purchase margin insurance broadly, how much
dairy farmers would pay for margin insurance, and what socio-economic factors relate
to those farm operators who would purchase margin insurance.
In order to answer these questions a survey of dairy farmers was conducted in five
states that together accounted for more than 40% of US production. In addition to
collecting farm and operator demographic data, contingent valuation questions were
employed to allow estimation of producer willingness-to-pay for dairy margin insur-
ance. The next section briefly reviews major US dairy policies and the trend away from
government support. The third section discusses the survey and data, respondent
demographics, estimation of willingness-to-pay for margin insurance, and examines
estimation results and policy implications. The final section summarizes our findings
and draws conclusions relevant for dairy producers, policy makers, and agricultural
industries more broadly.Background
U.S. federal dairy policies in large part originated in Farm Bill legislation of the 1930’s
as part of the New Deal (Manchester, 1983; Chouinard, et al., 2010). While there are
many policies that relate to the dairy industry, the policies that most directly supported
the farm milk price include the dairy price support program and the Milk Income Loss
Contract (MILC) programa.
The U.S. dairy price support program existed in some form from 1949 until 2014b.
For many years, in particular the 1980’s, the support price was set above market clear-
ing levels resulting in a surplus of milk production (Helmberger and Chen, 1994). After
the 1980’s the support price was decreased to a level where it rarely directly interfered
with market clearing allowing increased levels of farm milk price volatility (Figure 1).
The Dairy Price Support Program (DPSP) was an open offer from the Commodity
Credit Corporation (a federal governmental agency) to purchase butter, cheese, and
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Figure 1 US real milk support price and real manufactured milk farm price, 1980-October 2013
(2013 dollars), source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service,
2013a.
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years—by purchasing the aforementioned dairy products. Chavas and Kim (2004) con-
cluded that the Dairy Price Support Program reduced milk price volatility and affected
milk price levels even during periods when the support prices were not binding. The
DPSP was criticized in recent years for curbing product diversity and innovation, sup-
porting world dairy product prices, and being generally insufficient for U.S. farm prices
at current feed costs (Shields, 2011; Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute
Dairy Policy Alliance, 2010). Increased farm milk price volatility and higher feed costs
are primary drivers of the recent efforts to support dairy margins between milk and
feed prices rather than only milk price.
The Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program originated in the 2002 Farm Security
and Rural Investment Act (2002 Farm Bill). The MILC program was a counter-cyclical
dairy income support that paid producers a proportion (45 or 34 percent depending on
the year) of the difference between the reference and actual milk prices (i.e., a deficiency
payment). Farm payments were initially capped at 2.4 million pounds annually. The MILC
program was renewed in the 2008 Farm Bill when payments limits were increased to
2.985 million pounds per farm and an adjuster was added that increased payments when
feed costs were above a trigger level (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service
Agency, 2013). The financial assistance provided by the program meant that total milk
production would not decline as much when milk prices were depressed as herds would
have less incentive to cut back production (Jesse, 2005).
Payment limits meant that the MILC program disproportionately assisted smaller
herds as they could receive payments on most (or all) of their production. Additionally,
increasing herd sizes and concentration of farm-level milk production made the MILC
program less relevant to total milk production over time. The average U.S. milk cow
produces approximately 20,000 pounds of milk per year, thus the 2.4 million pound
annual cap translated to 120 milk cows and the 2.985 million pounds translated to
approximately 150 milk cows. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the percent of operations that
likely had all milk production covered in the period the MILC program existed has

















Figure 2 Percent of operations with milk cows by herd size, 2003 – 2012.
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clined to 74.1 percent of production by 2012. Meanwhile, large operations (with 1,000
or more milk cows) represented only 1.5 percent of all operations with milk cows in
2003 and doubled to 3.0 percent in 2012 (U.S. Department of Agriculture and National
Agricultural Statistics Service USDA-NASS 2013b). The amount of milk production
from the herds completely covered by MILC, however, is a different story. As illustrated
by Figure 3, operations with less than 100 milk cows produced 23.7 percent of all milk
production in 2003 and only 13.7 percent in 2012 (U.S. Department of Agriculture,
National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2013a). Operations with 1,000 or more milk
cows produced only 31.5 percent of all milk production in 2003 but a majority, 50.6
percent, in 2012. Thus, for operations producing a majority of U.S. milk production,
the income protection offered by the MILC program covered only a fraction of
farm-level production. The MILC program was repealed in the 2014 Farm Bill.
As can be surmised by the declines in the real price of the dairy price support pro-
gram and percent of milk production covered by the deficiency payments in the MILC
program, government support for U.S. dairy farms has declined in recent years. Using
OECD data, we can measure how much this support declined. Figure 4 displays the

















































































Figure 4 OECD US milk producer single commodity transfers, 1986–2012.
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Transfers are defined as the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers
and taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm gate level, arising from
policies linked to the production of a single commodity such that the producer must
produce the designated commodity in order to receive the transfer (OECD, 2013).
Percentage Producer Single Commodity Transfers (%PSC) are the commodity transfers
as a share of gross receipts for the specific commodity. For U.S. milk producers, the
%PSC declined to zero in 2008 and has been below 10 percent in recent years. This
decline in price support and direct payments fits the general movement in U.S. agricul-
ture policy to move away from or end direct payments.
Coinciding with this decrease in support was an increase in milk and feed price vola-
tility. One measure of the variation of milk and feed prices at the farm level is income
over feed cost, a commonly used proxy for dairy farm profitability. The margin between
milk price and feed cost is the amount available to pay for all other expenses, including
labor and returns to management, capital, and unpaid labor. Measuring income over
feed cost as the US all milk price less a weighted cost for corn and soybeans from 1990
through 2012, this monthly income over feed cost measure averaged $11 per hundred-
weight. From 1990 through 1999 the monthly coefficient of variation—the standard
deviation divided by the mean as a measure of percent variation—of this margin was
13.6%. From 2000 through 2012 the coefficient of variation increased to 20.4%. This
variation in profit margin occurred because variation increased in both the milk and feed
prices. Increased volatility in milk and feed prices in recent years has financially stressed
many dairy farms and led to calls for government programs to assist them. Dairy margin
insurance has been proposed as one option to hold the dairy farm safety net c.Dairy margin insurance
In 2007, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation approved the establishment of the
Livestock Gross Margin insurance program for dairy farms (LGM-Dairy). This program
became available in August 2008 for dairy producers in 31 states. In July 2010, LGM-
Dairy availability was expanded to all of the lower 48 states (Gould and Cabrera, 2011).
LGM-Dairy allows dairy farm operators to purchase insurance to protect against
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revenue and feed costs. Under this insurance policy, an indemnity at the end of coverage
period is the difference, if positive, between the market anticipated gross margins at con-
tract purchase and actual gross margins. The milk revenues and feed costs protected are
based on current futures contract settle prices that exist at insurance sign-up. Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME) Class III milk, corn, and soybean meal futures and options
markets are used as an information source in the setting of premiums and to determine
insurance indemnities at the end of the contract. The contract premiums are estab-
lished to be actuarially sound in the sense that over the long-run, the expected in-
demnities paid equal premiums before subsidy is applied (Gould and Cabrera, 2011).
Past research has highlighted the importance of premium subsidies for dairy margin
insurance (Valvekar et al., 2011).
Advantages of LGM-Dairy over traditional milk price supports and deficiency pay-
ments include that the insurance program: protects margin between milk and feed; has
premiums which mean that farmers share in the cost which should help align behav-
ioral incentives; the premiums are set by milk and feed futures and options market
which incorporate current market information; allows for the amounts of milk and feed
protected to change over time as the farmer desires; allows dairy farmers to scale it to
their needs rather than the contract sizes at the exchanges, and this insurance instru-
ment is expected to have no more than minimal effects on production decisions. In
addition, from the farmer’s perspective as there are no actual futures market transac-
tions there are no corresponding futures market margin calls.
Disadvantages of LGM-Dairy in holding the dairy farm safety net include: limited
availability and funding for premium subsidy; lack of knowledge and understanding in
the dairy farm industry regarding the insurance instrument; lack of institutional experi-
ence in dairy markets using such instrument products; and the local milk and feed
prices can vary substantially from the national benchmarks used (basis risk).
LGM-Dairy sales summary statistics are available since the 2008 market year. Over
this period the peak sales year was 2010 when the 46.2 million hundredweight of cover-
age sold represented 2.4% of the amount of milk produced in the U.S. that year (U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Risk Management Agency 2014). Part of the low participa-
tion was due to lack of funding levels in some periods. Other reasons farmers have not
used LGM-Dairy include lack of knowledge and perceived difficulty of use (Wolf and
Widmar, 2014). Given this relatively low level of participation, can this instrument hold
the safety net? Would this insurance be widely purchased? What are the characteristics
of the farms that would be willing to pay for it? And how much would they be willing
to pay? In order to answer these questions, we surveyed dairy farms in five major milk
producing states.Methods
Data were collected using a mail survey of 2,419 dairy farms from California, Florida,
Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin. The list of licensed milk producers was obtained
from each State’s respective Department of Agriculture in April 2012. After adjusting
for bad addresses and farm exits the number of operations surveyed by state were 468
from California (25% of operations with a license to ship milk), 115 from Florida (100%
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Michigan (25% of licensed operations), and 984 from Wisconsin (10% of licensed op-
erations). Together these states accounted for 40.9% of U.S. milk production in 2012
(U.S. Department of Agriculture and National Agricultural Statistics Service USDA-
NASS 2013b). The tailored survey method was employed with an initial survey in
May 2012 followed by a reminder card two weeks later and a second survey two
weeks after the reminder (Dillman et al. 2009).
Respondents identified dairy farm operator characteristics (age, education, experi-
ence), and operation characteristics including herd size, crop acreage, percent of feed
purchased, farm business organization, cooperative membership, and farm financial
solvency situation. Dairy producer respondents were also asked whether they had
utilized milk or feed price instruments at any point in the past. Of the 2,419 farms
surveyed, 662 were returned for a 27.4% response rate. By state the response rate
ranged from 16.5% in California to 34.1% in Indiana.
The survey also included basic information on margin insurance and a question to
elicit willingness-to-pay for margin insurance as follows:
“Currently, there exists insurance to protect the margin between milk and feed price. In
this section, we are interested in whether you would purchase an insurance policy that
protects a margin between Class III milk price and corn and soybean meal prices.There are many ways that the margin between milk and feed price can be calculated.
LGM-Dairy, for example, uses the Class III milk price futures from the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange as well as corn and soybean meal futures from the Chicago Board of
Trade to create a margin.Consider an insurance policy similar to LGM-Dairy that establishes a minimum income
over feed cost for the next 12 months using Class III milk, corn, and soybean meal futures.
The margin guarantee is the floor for the difference between milk and feed prices given the
quantity of feed protected. That is, if the actual margin between closing futures milk and
feed prices falls below the margin guarantee, you will be paid the difference.The premium rate is the amount that you will pay—per hundredweight of milk
protected—for the insurance regardless of whether you end up collecting an indemnity
or not.Experience from previous similar surveys is that people often agree to pay more in
hypothetical questions than they would actually pay. It is important that you answer
as if you were actually facing these choices in your farm management decisions.If an insurance policy is offered with a margin guarantee between milk price and feed
cost of $X/cwt and the premium (price) is $Y/cwt on covered milk production, would
you be willing to purchase the insurance?”
The statement about previous experience and answering as if it was an actual question
was part of a “cheap-talk strategy” to attempt to reduce hypothetical bias by simply inform-
ing participants of the bias before their participation in the experiment (Lusk, 2003).
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money, the following cheap talk statement was provided to respondents, “Experience
from previous similar surveys is that people often agree to pay more in hypothetical
questions than they would actually pay. It is important that you answer as if you were
actually facing these choices in your farm management decisions.” This statement is
part of a “cheap-talk strategy” to attempt to reduce hypothetical bias by simply inform-
ing participants of the bias before their participation in the experiment (Lusk, 2003).
Using information for LGM-Dairy insurance that was available at the time the survey
was conducted (April 2012), the relevant range of margins and premiums offered by the
market at that time was derived—plus an allowance on each side to encompass reasonable
possibilities. The result was that the margin (X) varied from $2 to $14 per hundredweight
of milk production in $2 increments. The premium (Y) varied from $0.10 to $1.30 per
hundredweight of milk in $0.30 increments. With seven margins and five premiums, there
were 35 potential combinations which were assigned randomly across the surveys.
The probability of a “Yes” response to the single-bound question depends on the probabil-
ity that the willingness-to-pay (WTP) with random error is greater than the premium given
Pr Yesð Þ ¼ Pr WTP þ e > $y=cwtð Þ: ð1Þ
When e is distributed normally the discrete choice estimation is performed using a probitmodel. All else equal (i.e., margin), the probability of a “Yes” response is expected to vary
inversely with the premium cost. The probit model is defined as Pr(y ≠ 0|x) =Φ(xb) where
Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution. The probit model has the estimation
form y = b’x + e, where y = 0 for farmers who answered “No” to the insurance purchase
question; y = 1 for farmers who answered “Yes” to the insurance purchase question; x is a
vector of explanatory variables; and b is a vector of coefficients.
Results and discussion
Summary characteristics of the sample farms are displayed in Table 1. These statistics
reflect expected patterns in operation and operator characteristics consistent with national
summaries from USDA. For example, the largest herds on average were managed by re-
spondents in California and Florida. Indiana respondents had the smallest average herd size
and youngest average operator age. Operator education was, on average, higher in California
and Florida respondents. The percent of sole proprietors (as opposed to partnerships,
limited liability companies, and incorporated operations) were higher in the Upper
Midwest states than in California and Florida. California and Florida also purchased a
larger percent of their feed requirements and had higher debt to asset ratios on average.
The operation and operator characteristics summarized in Table 1 are used below as
explanatory variables in the estimations to explain margin insurance purchase decisions.
Table 1 displays summary statistics conditional on whether the respondents had used
any milk or feed price risk management tools to date. About one-third of respondents
had used milk or feed price risk tools while the remaining two-thirds had not. Those
respondents who had used price risk management tools operated larger farms, both in
terms of herd size and acres operated. Mean values for all operator and operation char-
acteristics were statistically different between the two groups with the exception of op-
erator age (t-tests, 95%). Respondents who had used price risk tools also had herds
with higher milk production per cow, were much less likely to have their business
Table 1 Summary statistics
Variable Description All respondents Respondents who had
used risk management
Respondents who had
not used risk management
Mean (Standard deviation)
Herd size milk cows 360 (1,018) 713 (1,529) 167 (475)
Acres
operated
acres 652 (3,004) 846 (1,270) 371 (444)
Operator age years 51.0 (12.7) 50.6 (11.2) 51.2 (13.5)
Operator
education
years 12.66 (2.20) 13.59 (2.22) 12.18 (2.04)
Sole proprietors % yes 67.6 (49.7) 48.3 (50.1) 77.1 (42.1)
Dairy coop
member
% yes 78.7 (41.7) 74.8 (43.5) 80.8 (40.6)
Milk/cow lbs. milk/
cow/year





32.1 (24.8) 36.1 (26.5) 30.0 (23.7)
Solvency risk debt to asset
ratio (%)
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slightly higher debt to asset ratio.
The results of the probit estimation are displayed in Table 2. As the probit coeffi-
cients are not particularly intuitive, marginal effects of the explanatory variables are
also provided in Table 2. The first pair of results columns contain estimates across all
respondents while the final two pairs of columns display conditional results for those
farms that had and had not used risk management tools. With respect to all respon-
dents, the premium charged had a significant, negative sign. The margin offered
between milk and feed price (a proxy for profit margin protected) was not significant.
Operator education, milk marketing cooperative membership, milk production per
cow, and solvency risk (i.e., a high debt-to-asset) ratio all had positive effects on the
likelihood that respondents would purchase the margin insurance offered.
The second and third pairs of columns are the same estimation with the sample di-
vided into those farm managers who had utilized risk management tools and those who
had not. Respondents who had used price risk management tools were more likely to
purchase the offered margin insurance if they had more years of operator education. In
contrast to the group of respondents who had not used risk management tools, how-
ever, the margin level for those who had used price risk management tools was positive
and significant. All else constant, a higher margin offers more profit protection.
Respondents who had not used risk management tools were more likely to purchase
the offered insurance as operator education increased and as they were closer to insolv-
ency. Further, California respondents who had not used risk management tools were
more likely to purchase the offered insurance than were Wisconsin respondents (the
omitted State category).
Willingness-to-pay (WTP) per dollar of margin offered was calculated as
WTPMargin ¼ − βMarginβPremium
 
; where the coefficient on the margin variable is divided by the
Table 2 Probit estimates of margin insurance purchase and WTP/$ Margin
All respondents Respondents who had
used risk management
Respondents who had not
used risk management
Variable Coeff. Marginal Coeff. Marginal Coeff. Marginal
(St. Err.) Effect (St. Err.) Effect (St. Err.) Effect
Constant −3.4864* −3.8595* −3.017*
(0.8188) (1.3129) (1.2385)
Premium −0.8717* −0.2216* −0.8022* −0.2351* −1.1595* −0.2284*
(0.1883) (0.2822) (0.2871)
Margin 0.0277 0.0070 0.1058* 0.0310* −0.0338 −0.0067
(0.0187) (0.0314) (0.0265)
Cows 0.00004 0.00001 0.0001 0.00003 −0.0002 −0.00005
(0.00009) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Acres −0.00008 −0.00002 −0.0002 −0.00005 0.0002 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Operator age −0.0044 −0.0011 −0.0165 −0.0048 0.0030 0.0006
(0.0066) (0.0119) (0.0087)
Operator education 0.1372* 0.0349* 0.1813* 0.0531* 0.1034* 0.0204*
(0.0399) (0.0601) (0.0592)
Business organization 0.1329 0.0331 0.2163 0.0637 0.1299 0.0245
(0.1980) (0.2705) (0.3076)
Coop member 0.3416* 0.0796* 0.2993 0.0833 0.3502 0.0609
(0.1877) (0.2638) (0.3022)
Milk/cow 0.00004* 0.00001* 0.00004 0.00001 0.00004 8.83x10−6
(0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Purchased feed −0.0030 −0.0008 −0.0015 −0.0004 0.0059 −0.0012
(0.0040) (0.0059) (0.0080)
Solvency risk 0.0092* 0.0023* 0.0047 0.0014 0.0110* 0.0021*
(0.0039) (0.0069) (0.0053)
California 0.1515 0.0405 −0.2861 −0.0784 1.1326* 0.3439*
(0.2855) (0.3783) (0.5127)
Florida −0.5070 −0.1005 −0.5399 −0.1255 −0.0494 −0.0095
(0.5167) (0.7639) (0.7451)
Indiana −0.0660 −0.0165 0.0723 0.0216 −0.1986 −0.0368
(0.2230) (0.3574) (0.3279)
Michigan −0.0415 −0.0104 −0.2602 −0.0713 0.1993 0.0424
(0.2179) (0.3315) (0.3113)




(−0.01, 0.11) (0.05, 0.39) (−0.18, 0.12)
State coefficients are expressed relative to Wisconsin–the omitted state. * indicates significance at p < =0.10 level.
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was $0.04 per dollar of margin offered (e.g., $0.40/cwt for a $10/cwt margin). Respon-
dents who had used price risk tools had a mean WTP of $0.13/cwt margin while
those who had not used risk tools had a negative WTP. A negative WTP indicates
that they would need to be compensated to take the margin insurance. That is, they
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paid from 2009 through 2012 for LGM-Dairy insurance varied from $0.42 to $0.71/
cwt (U.S. Department of Agriculture and Risk Management Agency USDA-RMA
2014). Thus, those with previous experience with risk management tools were willing
to pay reasonable premiums for insurance. However, they constituted a minority of
respondents.
To calculate confidence intervals we employed the method of Krinsky and Robb
(1986). One thousand observations were drawn from a multivariate normal distribution
which was parameterized with the coefficients and variance-covariance matrix from the
respective probit estimations. The resulting 95 percent confidence intervals indicate
that only those respondents who had previously used risk management tools had a
strictly positive WTP—about 5 cents to 39 cents per hundredweight of margin offered.
With the long-term movement towards insurance rather than direct payments in US
agricultural policy, the question of whether this can work in areas not traditionally cov-
ered by crop insurance instruments such as milk production must be answered. Past
research has indicated that the most significant impediment to the use of crop insur-
ance is the complexity of the instruments and lack of understanding on the part of
farm operators (Coble et al. 2013). Dairy margin insurance is a complex risk manage-
ment tool that may substitute for or complement existing risk management efforts.
Thus, should margin insurance be utilized as the primary dairy farm safety policy,
educational programs would be critical to achieve wide-spread dairy farmer adoption.
Further, it might take considerable subsidies—perhaps up to 100 percent—to get
many of the smaller herds that had not previously used risk management tools to pur-
chase this margin insurance. Recall from Figure 3 that while the majority of the milk
production comes from herds with 1,000 or more milk cows, those herds comprise only
three percent of total herds. Thus, the majority of the herds represent a minority of the
actual milk production. The previously discussed MILC program was intentionally
slanted towards smaller dairy herds. In contrast, a subsidized insurance program with
no production limit will help larger herds more than the MILC program.Conclusions
U.S. dairy policy has a long history of intervention with the aim of supporting farm
income. Historically, these policies have focused on milk price but the price support
has been irrelevant in recent years and—along with the MILC program—recently was
repealed. At the same time, feed price increases and volatility have caused the focus for
dairy farm protection to shift to the margin between milk and feed prices. The long-
run movement towards insurance for major US field crops has until recently excluded
dairy. This research examined whether margin insurance could be the primary policy
that provides income protection to dairy farms.
Using a survey of dairy farms from five states that account for more than 40 percent
of US milk production, we find that a large portion of herds were simply not willing to
pay for margin insurance. Those that were willing to pay were the farms that had past
experience with milk and feed price risk management. Perhaps there was a lack of un-
derstanding about dairy margin insurance among those respondents that gave essen-
tially no value to the margin insurance. However, it is likely that dairy farmers
Wolf and Widmar Agricultural and Food Economics  (2015) 3:14 Page 12 of 13historically accustomed to receiving protection in the form of milk price support and
deficiency payments were less likely to be willing to pay for their own insurance. Con-
sistent with past research that uses hypothetical questions, we must be cognizant that
the stated preference approach can suffer from bias. Thus, it would be appropriate to
consider these willingness-to-pay estimates to be upper bound values.
The recently passed 2014 Farm Bill created a new Margin Protection Program that
has similarities to the margin protection offered in the survey and some comparison is
enlightening. While some refer to the new margin protection program as “insurance” it
actually is not a true insurance program. The premiums are fixed rather than based on
market assessments of risk. The fixed premiums range in price from free for a $4/cwt
margin to $1.36/cwt for coverage of production over 4 million pounds at an $8/cwt
margin. The existence of this margin protection program will likely diminish the
demand for private risk management tools and margin insurance.
The LGM-Dairy program was also continued and dairy farmers will choose between
the Margin Protection and LGM-Dairy Programs. At the time of the survey we
analyze here, there was no margin protection program so this new program did not
influence farmer response to our survey. Further, the Margin Protection Program is
currently scheduled to terminate at the end of 2018. If the program is expensive, inef-
fective, or unpopular, it may not be continued. The long-term movement towards
more market oriented insurance instruments remains the dominant trend in US agri-
cultural policy. Our results indicate a bifurcated response to dairy margin insurance
across herd size and the need for more education to implement this policy as a
foundation of the safety net.Endnotes
aAt the time the survey and analysis were performed, the 2014 Farm Bill had not
passed into law and there was a great deal of uncertainty about the future direction of
US dairy policy. The 2014 Farm Bill created the Margin Protection Program for Dairy
Producers (MPP-Dairy) which provides margin protection at subsidized rates. Livestock
Gross Margin Insurance for Dairy continues to exist.
bThe Dairy Product Price Support Program was renamed the Dairy Product Price
Support Program in 2008 and repealed as part of the 2014 Farm Bill. The Price Support
Program remains part of the permanent law which will take effect in 2019 unless the
current law is extended or new legislation is passed.
cDairy producers could also manage their own profit margin risk using bundles of
milk and feed futures and options but this has disadvantages including lumpy contracts,
thin markets and basis risk (Bozic et al. 2012).Competing interests
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